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Which States Enter into Treaties, and Why?
Thomas J. Miles & Eric A. Posner1
July 11, 2008

Abstract. Treaties are the primary source of international law. But little is known about which countries enter
into treaties, which forms the treaties take, and which subjects they address. We present an exploratory analysis
of a unique dataset of roughly 50,000 treaties ratified since 1946. We hypothesize that states enter treaties in
order to obtain public goods but that the transaction costs of negotiating and enforcing treaties also limit the
value of treaties. Simple predictions are that larger and richer states should benefit more from cooperation:
therefore, they should be parties to more treaties. Older, less corrupt, and (again) larger states should face lower
transaction costs and should belong to more treaties. Consistent with this prediction, these states enter into
more bilateral treaties and “closed” multilateral treaties, but universal multilateral treaties where the benefits of
cooperation are more attenuated and the costs of negotiation are low for small states.

One of the most striking trends in international relations since World War II has
been the proliferation of treaties. States have entered more than 45,000 bilateral treaties and
8,000 multilateral treaties since World War II, including more than 600 multilateral treaties
sponsored by the United Nations. Although there are no reliable data on treaties prior to
World War II, there is no doubt that the rate of treaty-making, at least among the most
active states, has increased dramatically since then. Why do some states enter so many
treaties while others enter into so few?
The standard answer to this question is that states enter treaties in order to obtain
gains from cooperation. But this answer is only the beginning of the analysis. Not only do
some states enter more treaties than others, some enter certain types of treaties (trade,
human rights) more than others. Some states prefer multilateral treaties to bilateral treaties;
among states that enter multilateral treaties, some issue reservations more than others. States
entering bilateral treaties choose different treaty partners and choose different number of
treaties to make with each partner. The simple assertion that treaty-making occurs when it
generates gains for the participating states is insufficient to explain variations across these
dimensions of treaty-making.

1 The University of Chicago Law School. Comments are most welcome at tmiles “at” law.uchicago.edu and
eposner “at” uchicago.edu. Early drafts of this research were presented at a conference in Bonn, Germany, at
the American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, 2007, Northwestern, Harvard, and Stanford.
We are grateful to participants at those workshops for comments, especially Stefan Voigt, Daniel Drezner, and
Alan Sykes. We thank Yuon Jin (Ann) Choi, Kim Foley, Nicholas Pontzer, Luke Thara, Daniel Zainulbhai, and
especially Gregory Pesce for research assistance.

Many empirical regularities of treaty-making remain almost entirely unknown. Basic
facts, such as which types of treaties countries most commonly enter and which types of
countries engage in the most treaty-making – let alone what are the consequences of treatymaking – have not been established. Political scientists have begun to analyze treaty activity
in a serious empirical fashion only in the past few years. So far, the literature has focused on
compliance with treaties (e.g., Simmons 2006) and not on signature and ratification.2
Although political scientists have long been interested in particular treaty regimes, including
why states enter them and how they operate, they have not exploited treaty databases in
order to reveal large-scale regularities in treatymaking. International law scholars have
generally concerned themselves with the normative implications of treaty-making. Many
believe that states should contribute to the development of international law by entering
treaties, especially multilateral treaties (see, e.g., Blum 2006 for a discussion). But this
scholarship proceeds largely without empirical evidence.
This paper begins to fill the gap in our understanding of when treaty-making occurs
and which forms it takes by providing a foundational set of facts. Drawing on a variety of
sources, we develop a database of treaty-making since 1946. It includes the treaties each
country has entered into, the dates of entry, the subject matter and form (e.g., bilateral or
multilateral) of each treaty, dates of signature and ratification, reservations, and related data.
In this paper, we explore the cross-sectional features of these data. Among other things, we
document which countries and regions engage in the most treaty-making. We decompose
treaty-making by subject area and form: bilateral and multilateral. We also consider which
countries are most likely to lodge reservations against multilateral treaties.
Our investigation is not purely descriptive, however. We make several predictions
about the pattern of treaty-making and test these predictions. We argue that states enter
treaties in order to obtain public goods, but that negotiating and enforcing treaties are
costly—that is, they involve transaction costs. When a state decides whether to enter a treaty,
it compares the benefit from the public good and the transaction costs. As the potential
public goods increase, and as transaction costs decline, a state is more likely to enter a treaty,
all else equal.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I presents our stylized conceptual framework
and our basic empirical conjectures. Section II describes our data and its sources, and
presents key summary statistics that reveal the basic patterns in treaty-making by geography
and treaty subject. Sections III presents our empirical results, and Section IV offers our
tentative conclusions and directions for future work.
2 Exceptions include Vreeland (2008) who studies why dictatorships join the Convention Against Torture.
Also, the economics of trade literature examines the impact of trade treaties (e.g., Rose 2004; Von Stein 2005;
Goldstein et al., 2007) and the determinants of trade policy (e.g., Mansfield and Reinhardt, 2003; Mansfield et
al., 2002). There is also a related literature on the factors that determine whether states enter international
organization (e.g., Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006).
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I. Conceptual Framework: Public Goods and Transaction Costs
Public goods and state size. A standard prediction is that states enter into treaties to
secure gains from cooperation. These gains typically take the form of public goods. We
follow the familiar assumptions that the geographic boundaries of a state are fixed,3 and that
one of the functions of a state is the provision of public or collective goods, such as internal
policing, external defense, regulation of industry, enforcement of contracts and property
rights, and the provision of a social safety net. A large state takes advantage of economies of
scale, and so can provide large-scale public goods more cheaply than small states can.
The advantage of the treaty is that it allows governments to produce different public
goods at different scales. Consider an example in which environmental quality and the size
of economic markets are public goods. If environmental regulation is best performed at the
state level, while the optimal size for economic markets would be at the two-state level, then
the two states can remain separate, regulate the environment separately, and create a twostate market through a trade treaty. When populations are heterogeneous, and so the optimal
scale for most public goods is relatively low, smaller states can more effectively supply the
low-scale public goods while using treaties to supply the higher-scale public goods. This logic
implies that treaty-making and state size are substitutes, and thus that smaller states belong to
more treaties than larger states do.4 Small states must enter treaties in order to produce the
public goods that large states can produce internally.
This prediction, that the number of states increases as the cost of treaty-making
declines, has some support in recent history. Contemporaneous with the proliferation of
treaties has been the fragmentation of states. In 1945, there were fewer than 80 states; today
there are almost 200. Some scholars attribute the fragmentation of states to globalization.
Alesina and Spolaore (2003) claim that a more benign international trade and security
environment contributed to this trend.
Note, however, that the prediction is not as clear as it might first seem. First, the
analysis in this paper examines a cross-section of countries, and we do not observe
movements over time in the number of treaties, particularly movements in response to
merger and break-up events. If variations in the extensive margin of state sizes are not
observed, it is unlikely that substitution effects can be detected. In addition to this
observational difficulty, a new literature argues that large states have advantages in governing
because the fixed costs of government can be spread across the larger population (Mulligan
3

Alesina and Spolaore (2003) and Spolaore and Warczaig (2005) present analyses in which borders are treated
as endogenous, but they do not consider the possibility of treaties.
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This logic has a strong analogy to Coase’s (1937) theory of the firm. Treaty-making activity may be a rough
proxy for cooperation between states, analogous to the choice of a firm to contract with other firms rather than
expand by purchasing other firms or hiring employees. At the extreme, we could imagine thousands of states
cooperating by treaty.
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& Shleifer 2005). If this argument is correct, it may be that larger states will enter more
treaties because treaty-making itself has high fixed costs, and larger states can spread this
cost over a larger population. Larger states not only can maintain larger foreign ministries to
negotiate and monitor treaties; they can also more effectively retaliate if treaty partners
violate a treaty. According to this view, state size and treaty-making are complements.
Even if the larger countries do not have the advantage of lower fixed costs of treatymaking, they may offer higher net benefits of scale with the result that they enter into more
treaties. If small states gain more from entering treaties with larger states than with other
small states, then large states could end up belonging to more treaties. Consider, for
example, a large state L and three small states S1, S2, and S3. If each of the three small states
seeks access to a larger economic market, and if the cost of concluding a treaty varies little
with country size, then a treaty with L would promise the largest net benefits. A treaty with L
would grant access to a larger market than a treaty with either of the smaller countries, and it
would do so at roughly the same cost. Were each of the small states to pursue a treaty with
the larger state, then L would belong to three treaties, while S1, S2, and S3 would each
belong to only one treaty.5 This example produces two predictions: (1) larger states enter
into more treaties; and (2) many treaties should arise between large states and small states, as
well as between large states, and few treaties between small states. Thus, there are plausible
reasons to expect the opposite of the Coasean prediction.
Other transaction costs measures. If states obtain benefits by entering treaties, they also
face transaction costs. Treaties are highly costly both to negotiate and to enforce.
Negotiation costs are familiar from the law and economics literature on contracts. Treaties,
like contracts, describe the obligations of parties extending into the future. Because the
future is difficult to predict, resources must be spent in anticipating possible contingencies
that increase the cost or reduce the benefits of treaty compliance. For example, a trade treaty
that reduces tariff barriers might create no problems today, when domestic producers who
compete with imports are prosperous, but might create political problems in the future, if a
recession throws these producers’ employees out of work. Adding detail to the treaty—such
as conditional obligations—requires further effort. And, throughout, parties must bargain
over how the surplus created by the treaty should be divided, which can give rise to bluffing,
impasses, and other costs.
Enforcement costs are also significant. Each party must monitor the other in order
to guard against treaty violations. Monitoring can be extremely difficult, and even after the
violation is detected, the cost of enforcement is high. Because self-help is the only remedy, a
state must deprive itself of the benefits of the cooperative relationship in order to sanction
Moreover, if larger states regularly engaged in more treaties than smaller states, the costs of establishing
treaties may fall for large states. That is, there may be economies of scale in treaty-making, and if so, it provides
another reason why larger countries may enter into more treaties.
5
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the violator. Retaliation further interferes with the production of the public good in the short
term.
Transaction costs are, of course, difficult to measure. We consider two measures:
corruption level and age. We conjecture that non-corrupt governments will, all else equal,
want to avoid entering treaties with corrupt governments. Corruption raises the cost of
treaty-making in at least two ways. It may be necessary to make illicit payments in order to
induce a corrupt government to agree to a treaty, and the costs of enforcing a treaty with a
corrupt government may be higher given the danger that corrupt officials can be bribed to
violate treaty obligations. This approach to reverses the causal direction of Sandholtz and
Gray (2003), who argue that international integration reduces corruption.
With regard to a country’s age, older countries face lower transaction costs than
newer countries do. Older countries, we conjecture, have more established customs, norms,
and political institutions, which allow for smoother operation of the government, and hence
cheaper negotiation, monitoring, and enforcement of treaties. Thus, older states may be
party to more treaties than younger states are.
Types and Forms of Treaties. State size and transactions costs may influence the form of
treaty-making in addition to the frequency of treaty-making. We distinguish three types of
treaty-making: (1) bilateral treaties; (2) multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary
General of the United Nations, which call “open” multilateral treaties or U.N. multilateral
treaties; and (3) other multilateral treaties that are not deposited with the Secretary General,
and which we call “closed” or non-U.N. multilateral treaties. Bilateral treaties are simply
treaties between two states. Multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary General are
treaties that have been sponsored by a United Nations organ such as the General Assembly
or a UN regional commission. Under UN rules, these treaties are supposed to be of more
general interest to the international community; they include the major human rights treaties,
the Geneva Conventions, the Kyoto protocol, and the like.6 Generally, these treaties are
open to all countries in the world, or to all countries in a particular region. Closed
multilateral treaties reflect more parochial or regional concerns; these include trade
agreements and military alliances. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
between Canada, Mexico, and the United States is an example of a closed multilateral treaty.
Each type of treaty presents a potentially different combination of costs and benefits
to state. An analogy to standard-form contracts makes these differences apparent. Bilateral
treaties and closed multilateral treaties are unlike standard-form contracts in that the
particular parties negotiate them and tailor them to their specific needs. A plausible
assumption is that negotiating and drafting bilateral treaties and closed multilateral treaties
involve high transactions costs because of their specificity. In contrast, open multilateral
6

See United Nations 2006, § 2.3.
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treaties are closer to standard-form contracts. The transactions costs of negotiating open
multilateral treaties may be high because more countries potentially participate in the
drafting. But a goal of these treaties is often universal adoption, and once negotiated, the
marginal cost of adding another member is low. Bilateral and closed multilateral treaties do
not have do not have the same advantage of ex-post adjustments in participation. The
marginal cost of a new partner to a bilateral or multilateral treaty is high because all
participants must renegotiate the treaty.
States may enter open multilateral treaties subject to reservations that limit their
obligations under these treaties. A plausible explanation for this practice is that reservations
enable states to deviate from one-size-fits-all treaty obligations without obtaining advantages
over non-reserving states, whose own obligations toward reserving states are reduced in
reciprocal fashion (Parisi and Sevcenko 2002; Swaine 2006). States enter multilateral treaties
in order to reduce the transaction costs of negotiating dozens of bilateral treaties, but the
ability to reserve ensures that states whose interests are not adequately reflected in the treaty
itself are not forced to an all-or-nothing choice between ratifying an unattractive treaty or
opting out. International lawyers fear that this practice weakens international institutions and
limits the development of international law, at least with respect to major standard-setting
treaties such as human rights treaties.
Variation in the costs and benefits of treaty forms suggests that states’ preferred
treaty forms will differ. States that enter into bilateral and closed multilateral treaties most
often are apt to be those with the largest gains from and lowest costs to individualized
contracting. Open multilateral treaties should not correlate with country size because their
ambition of global membership minimizes the cost of adding additional members. But to the
extent that reservations to open multilateral treaties are a form of individualized contracting
or opting out, states with lower transactions costs and larger sizes may be more likely to
lodge reservations.
In sum, we advance four main empirical predictions:
● Larger states enter into more treaties. (A competing hypothesis is that
larger states enter into fewer treaties).
● States with lower transactions costs, as proxied by a more advanced age
and a lower degree of corruption, enter into more treaties.
● The frequency with which countries enter into U.N. treaties should not
depend on a state’s size.
● Smaller countries and countries with higher transactions costs should be
less likely to enter into bilateral treaties or multilateral treaties outside of the
U.N. framework.
II. Data
7

A. Treaty Types
Sources of treaties. Our data set consists of treaties that states have entered since 1946.
For bilateral treaties and multilateral treaties other than those sponsored by a United Nations
organ, we rely on the Washington Treaty Index.7 The WTI database is more comprehensive
than the United Nations Treaty Series, which other scholars have used. The UNTS consists
of treaties that states have voluntarily registered with the UN Secretariat.8 The WTI consists
of the UNTS treaties plus many thousands of treaties that states have not registered with the
Secretariat. The superior comprehensiveness of the WTI is partly offset by the fact that data
collection stopped in the 1990s, whereas the UNTS has been kept up to date. We use the
WTI because even with these limitations it contains many thousands more treaties than the
UNTS does. For multilateral treaties sponsored by a United Nations organ, we rely on the
UN multilateral treaties database. This database is complete, and includes much useful
information about reservations and other treaty actions as well.
Bilateral treaties can be decomposed by the type of treaty partner: those between two
states, and those between a state and a multinational organization. Our bilateral data set
consists of 38,186 bilateral treaties between states and 8,513 bilateral treaties between one
state and an international organization. Our multilateral UN treaty data set consists of 667
multilateral treaties. The average such treaty has about 32 parties. Our multilateral non-UN
treaty data set consists of 6,258 treaties; the average such treaty has about 4 parties.
Omission of treaties and inclusion of void and minor treaties. States are legally obligated to
register all treaties with the United Nations. Treaties that are not registered cannot be
invoked before an organ of the United Nations. Nonetheless, it is clear that all states do not
register all treaties (Blum 2006). States might refrain from submitting secret treaties or
treaties that other states might object to; they might also simply neglect to submit treaties.
The compilers of the WTI tried to adjust for this problem by soliciting unregistered treaties
directly from governments; however, we do not know whether these efforts might have been
affected by bias. We have found some anomalies by cross-checking registrations of parties to
the same treaty. It appears that the countries with higher per capita income and more honest
governments report more often. We can fix this problem to some extent but not completely.
If the U.S. and Costa Rica are parties to a treaty that the U.S. registers but Costa Rica fails to
register, we assume that the treaty is valid and both states are parties to it. But if two poor
states both fail to register the treaty, our results will be biased. In addition, the UN data base
counts an initial treaty ratified at time 1 and a mutual withdrawal at time 2 as two treaties
rather than zero treaties, which is troublesome; more troublesome, treaties that have fallen
into desuetude, minor treaties, and major treaties are all given equal weight.

7
8

See the World Treaty Index, http://db.lib.washington.edu/wti/wtdb.htm. See Pearson 2001.
See United Nations Treaty Collection, http://untreaty.un.org/English/treaty.asp. See Kohona 2002.
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Omission of treaty-substitutes. The data set omits non-treaty agreements, which are often
functionally similar or even identical to real treaties. Many such agreements are made
between ministries or departments of governments of different states rather than officially
by the governments themselves, but as far as we know they are no less likely to be complied
with. For example, the U.S. Department of Energy lists dozens of agreements that it has
made with similar ministries in more than fifty other states.9 These agreements might be
appropriately counted as treaties for purpose of our analysis, but we have no way to find
them systematically. However, we also have no reason to think that states’ official treatymaking is unrepresentative of their lower-level agreements.
Quasi-states. Many treaties in the WTI and the UNTS data sets do not involve
sovereign states but dependencies of states. We exclude these treaties from our regressions.
New, old, and successor states. When a state divides, typically but not always one of the
new states can be identified as the continuing version of the old state, while the other states
are treated as originating with the division. The old state’s treaties are mainly allocated to the
continuing state, but they might also be inherited by the others. For example, Russia
inherited the treaties of the Soviet Union; Kazakhstan did not. In some cases, as when
Czechoslovakia divided into the Czech and Slovak republics, the treaties must be allocated
on an ad hoc basis. This point is of importance when trying to determine the age of states in
our data set, and we use various methods for handling these problems (including running
regressions with and without the problematic states).
Timing. Our cross-sectional dataset reflects social, economic, and demographic
information on states from approximately 1980 to 2000. Because between-state variation is
much greater than longitudinal, within-state variation during this period, we do not think it
matters that all of the information is not from the same year. States that came into this
existence during this period were dropped from the regressions.
B. Summary Statistics on Treaties
Geography. Table 1.A presents averages for the number of treaties states joined and
the level of membership in those treaties. The averages are taken across continents to
provide insight into the geographic distribution of treaties.10

9 U.S. Department of Energy, Bilateral International Agreements, https://ostiweb.osti.gov/iaem/countryframe_bi.html.
10 Note that the method of calculation implies the double-counting of bilateral treaties between states. If
Canada has a treaty with Tanzania, the treaty enters the data twice—once as a Canadian treaty and a second
time as a Tanzanian treaty. For bilateral treaties between a state and a non-state organization, there is no double
counting. Averages are taken across continents, and non-state organizations are not coded as having any
particular geography. When averages area taken across continents, the organization’s tallies are therefore
excluded from the calculations.
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Column (1) shows the average number of bilateral treaties countries have ratified.
The magnitude of the variation across continents is enormous. The average for North
America is more than ten times that of Africa. The North American average is driven by the
United States, which is party to 7,181 bilateral treaties;. The next most active nation, France,
is party to 3,707 bilateral treaties. The third most active, Spain, is party to 2,527 bilateral
treaties, and China is the fourth most active with 2,490 bilateral treaties. North America has
nearly five times the average number of bilateral treaties with states as the second-ranked
continent (Europe). The average state has entered 463 bilateral treaties.
Column (2) reports similar averages for bilateral treaties between states and
organizations. Again, North America has the highest average. The level of these averages is
much lower than those in column (1), which indicates that treaties between a state and an
organization are less frequent than treaties between two states. The difference is particularly
striking in continents with mostly developed countries. In North America, the values in
columns (1) and (2) differ by almost an order of magnitude, and in Europe, the average
number of bilateral treaties with non-state partners is about 11% of the average number of
bilateral treaties with state partners. Among the developing world, the gap is not quite as
large. For example, in Africa, the average number of bilateral treaties with non-state partners
is about half of the average number of bilateral treaties with state partners. This is consistent
with the larger role international organizations play in developing economies.
Column (3) shows the number of “closed” or non-UN multilateral treaties joined by
the average state, or the number of such multilateral treaties that a state has ratified. Column
(4) reports the average number of partners belong to the non-UN multilateral treaties that
states in a given continent join. For example, imagine that every state on continent X
belonged to two non-UN multilateral treaties, one of which had 50 members and the other
had 100 members. In this instance, the average number of treaty partners states on continent
X would have for the UN multilateral treaties which they joined would be 75. This measure
gives an indication of whether states are joining non-UN multilateral treaties that many other
states are joining.
As with bilateral treaties, North America – and specifically the United States –
dominates the number of closed multilateral treaties joined. Europe is not far behind with
568 closed multilateral treaties joined on average, and again, African countries belong to
relatively few closed multilateral treaties. In addition, the number of closed multilateral
treaties joined appears inversely related to the average membership in the closed multilateral
treaties joined. For example, comparing columns (3) and (4), African countries join on
average fewer non-UN multilateral treaties (171 versus 327 for all countries). But the nonUN treaties which African countries join tend to be the treaties with the widest
subscriptions. The treaties that Latin American countries join have on average 50 other
countries as members, compared with 39 for all countries. Europe and North America
10

exhibit the opposite pattern. Countries on these continents join on average more non-UN
multilateral treaties (569 and 672, respectively), and on average, the non-UN treaties
European countries join tend to have fewer participants (30 for both). States that join few
closed multilateral treaties appear to join the more popular or more widely subscribed
multilateral treaties, while states that join many closed multilateral treaties appear to join
some less popular or less widely subscribed multilateral treaties.
Columns (5) and (6) repeat the exercise for closed or non-UN multilateral treaties.
Just as with closed multilateral treaties, an inverse relationship between number of treaties
joined and average treaty membership emerges among open multilateral treaties. States in
North America and Europe join the most open multilateral treaties but these treaties have a
smaller number of members on average. In contrast, states in Africa join relatively few open
multilateral treaties, but these treaties have relatively high average membership. Asian
countries are outliers in this pattern; they join relatively few closed multilateral treaties and
these treaties have a low average membership.
But the averages for non-UN multilateral treaties contrast with the averages for UN
treaties in three ways. First, the variation is much less than that of bilateral treaties. The
averages range from a high of 173 in Europe to a low of 84 in Latin America. The more
modest geographic variation in open multilateral treaties is likely due to the fact that there is
a limited number of UN multilateral treaties available for states to join while the number of
bilateral and closed multilateral arrangements states may concoct among themselves is
potentially infinite. Second, the average number of non-UN multilateral treaties joined is, on
most continents, roughly double that of the UN multilateral treaties joined. Third, the
average number of members to the non-UN multilateral treaties is between a half to a third
of the average for UN treaties. States tend to belong to more closed multilateral treaties than
open multilateral treaties, but each closed multilateral treaty has on average fewer members
than open multilateral treaties do.
The last two columns of Panel A consider the frequency with which states advance
reservations against UN treaties. Column (7) shows that the average number of UN
multilateral treaties that states on each continent have joined with reservations. The global
average is 25 relative to an average 114 UN treaties joined, or about 22% of the average
number of UN treaties joined. Countries in Europe and Latin America are the outliers.
European countries lodge reservations to an average of 36 of the multilateral treaties it joins,
while the average Latin American country does so to only 19 multilateral treaties. In
percentage terms, the average European country issues reservations in 44% of the
multilateral treaties it joins, and the average Latin American country issues reservations in
only 17%.
The final column of Panel A displays the average number of partners in the
multilateral UN treaties that are ratified with reservations. For every continental average, the
11

treaties against which countries advance reservations have more members than the
multilateral treaties that garner no reservations. Treaties for which a country issues a
reservation have on average fifteen more member countries than the average of all
multilateral treaties the country joins. This difference is consistent with the view that the
ability to lodge a reservation makes a treaty acceptable to a larger number of states.
Treaty subjects. Panel B of Table 1 displays average characteristics of treaties by their
subject area. The unit of analysis here is a treaty, unlike in Panel A where it was countries.
The columns report the number of treaties, with the exception of column (4) which reports
the average number of member states per treaty.
Columns (1) through (3) show that despite the considerable attention that treaties on
human rights, refugees, and cultural issues receive, they comprise an exceedingly small share
of the total number of treaties. This pattern persists across the types of treaty forms –
bilateral between states, bilateral between a state and a non-state entity, and closed
multilateral. Instead, the three types of treaties that we classify as “economic” – international
trade and development, transportation and communication, and fiscal matters – collectively
represent the most common subject of a treaty. Economic treaties comprise a majority of
bilateral treaties, irrespective of whether the partner is a state or non-state entity, and also a
majority of closed multilateral treaties. Trade treaties, a subcategory of economic treaties,
account for a plurality of bilateral treaties between states and of closed multilateral treaties.
They constitute a majority of bilateral treaties with non-state entities, which is consistent
with many of these treaties involving trade associations and development organizations.
In terms of their membership, closed multilateral treaties have relatively modest
memberships. The average number of states joining each closed multilateral treaty is four,
and the average varies little by subject matter.
The remaining columns of Panel B turn attention to the subjects of UN multilateral
treaties. The number of such treaties (667) is about a tenth the number of closed multilateral
treaties (6,258), and it is about a fiftieth the number of bilateral treaties (38,186). Again, the
share of UN treaties pertaining to high-salience issues, such as human rights, refugees, and
education and culture, is quite small. Economic treaties account for 32% of UN multilateral
treaties, but unlike bilateral and closed multilateral arrangements, UN multilateral treaties
rarely address the issues of trade and development. Instead, most of the economic UN
multilateral treaties address issues of transportation and communication. Also, UN
multilateral treaties address a wider diversity of topics. More than half of the UN treaties
were so difficult to classify that we placed them in the catchall category of “other.”
Regarding membership in UN multilateral treaties, column (6) shows that economic
treaties have been ratified by roughly the same average number of countries – about 30 – as
other types of treaties. An exception is the economic subcategory trade and development
12

which has only 23 members on average. Some of the non-economic categories, such as the
treaties pertaining to refugees and civil and criminal litigation, have a higher average number
of members.
The final two columns of Panel B address the relationship between reservations in
UN multilateral treaties and their subject areas. Column (7)shows that the incidence of
reservations to economic treaties is approximately the same as it is among all multilateral
treaties on deposit with the United Nations. That rate is about 13%. The rate is considerably
higher among some of the non-economic categories. Over 50% of treaties governing civil
and criminal litigation have at least one member country that has lodged a reservation, and
the rate is 40% or more for treaties governing refugees, and education and cultural matters.
The final column of the panel shows that multilateral treaties receiving at least one
reservation have a higher average membership than other multilateral treaties. Overall, these
treaties have on average twenty more member countries than the average membership of all
multilateral treaties. For treaties in some of the non-economic categories, the gap is even
larger. The membership of diplomatic and consular treaties, human rights treaties, and
refugee treaties is more than double when those treaties have received at least one
reservation.
III. Regression Analysis
To control for the multiple factors potentially influencing treaty-making, we analyze
the data with cross-sectional regressions of the form
Yi = Piα + Xiβ + εi,
where Yi is a measure of treaties into which state i has entered. Typically, Yi is the number of
treaties of a particular type that country i has entered, or the fraction of treaties that country i
with a particular characteristic has entered.11 Pi is the population of state i, Xi is a vector of
other independent variables for state i, and εi is an error term. The independent variables
include (logs) of population and real GDP per capita. Ethnolinguistic diversity measures the
heterogeneity of a population along ethnic and linguistic lines: a higher measure means
greater diversity. Consistent with our discussion of transactions costs, we include an index of
corruption perception and the (log of a) state’s age. The corruption perception index reflects
the degree of corruption: a lower score indicates greater corruption. The number of contiguous
countries are included as a control variable because it seems likely that a state will have more
treaties if it has more neighbors. In view of the legal origins literature (La Porta, et al. 1998),

For regressions on the number of treaties, the dependent variables are effectively count data. For that reason,
we also estimated Poisson regressions, and the results were qualitatively similar. For the sake of simplicity in
this exploratory analysis, only OLS estimates are reported here.
11
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we include indicators for common law, religious law, and civil law (which is omitted from
the regressions as it provides the baseline). Continent dummies are also included.12
All Treaties and Bilateral Treaties. Panel A of Table 2 reports OLS estimates on all
treaties and bilateral treaties. Column (1) reports the relationship between state
characteristics and the (log of the) number of treaties of any type that the state has ratified,
and column (2) conducts a similar exercise for the (log of) bilateral treaties. Both population
and per-capita income correlate strongly with the number of treaties of any type and the
number of bilateral treaties a state enters. The number of bilateral treaties and treaties of all
types also rise with the age of a state and the honesty of its government (i.e., as corruption
declines). These estimates are consistent with the “demand-side” predictions that larger
states and states with lower transactions costs will enter into more treaties. First, less corrupt
countries are more desirable trading partners, because contract formation and enforcement
is less costly with more honest partners. Illicit side payments are less necessary and cheating
on economic bargains are less frequent where corruption is less prevalent. Second, countries
with large internal markets are desirable trading partners for smaller countries whose own
domestic markets have more modest scale. Relationships between treaty-making and the
other explanatory variables are weaker. The number of contiguous states appears unrelated
to the number of treaties joined. The degree of ethnolinguistic diversity in a state and its
possessing a legal origin other than the civil law have positive associations with the total
number of treaties entered. But these correlations are not statistically significant.
These results show that larger and richer countries enter into more treaties of all
sorts as well as into more treaties in bilateral form. But does bilateral treaty-making account
for a larger share of such states’ treaties? To assess this possibility, the dependent variable in
the regression reported in column (3) is the fraction of a state’s treaties that are bilateral. The
United States is an outlier according to this measure as well. Forty-five percent of the
average country’s treaties are bilateral, but 87% of the United States’ treaties are bilateral.
The strongest correlates of a higher share of bilateral treaties are the size of a country’s
population and its age. These estimates imply that as a state’s population size grows and as it
ages, it will enter into more treaties of all types but will enter into disproportionately more
bilateral treaties. Other characteristics do not show statistically significant relationships with
the percentage of bilateral treaties. For example, while richer states enter into more treaties,
they appear to enter into more treaties of all types; the fraction of bilateral treaties does not
rise substantially as a state becomes wealthier. These results provide a partial confirmation of
the prediction about state size, transactions costs, and the choice of treaty form.
For our dependent variable, we use the total number of treaties states had joined by 2000. The population
and real GDP per capita data are the averages of 1980 and 2000. Because most of the variation in the data are
cross-sectional, the specific years that we use do not matter. In alternative specifications, we add year fixed
effects, which do not have a significant impact on our results. We also control for the stock of treaties, which
also do not have a significant impact on our results.

12
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The United States is an outlier with extraordinary number of treaties, and for that
reason, the regressions in the last three columns repeat those in the first three but exclude
the United States. (Panels B and C, discussed below, also probe the robustness of the
estimates to the exclusion of the United States.) These results show that none of the
conclusions hinge on the United States.
Multilateral Treaties. Panel B of Table 2 turns attention to multilateral treaty-making.
In the regression in column (1), the dependent variable is the (log of the) number of open or
UN multilateral treaties a state has entered, and in column (2), it is the (log of the) number of
closed or non-UN multilateral treaties a state has entered. Both types of multilateral treatymaking feature a strong positive correlation with a state’s income level. But other state
characteristics exhibit sharply different relationships with the two forms of multilateral
treaties.
With the exception of income level, none of the observed characteristics of a state
correlate significantly with the number of UN multilateral treaties it joins. Particularly
striking in view of its strong relationship with other forms of treaty-making is the lack of a
correlation between population size and UN multilateral treaties. Although too much
importance should not be attached to R-squares, it is striking that the explanatory variables
account for a much smaller proportion of the variation in the number of UN treaties a state
joins than that of the other types of treaties joined. The absence of other strong correlations
here should perhaps not be surprising because multilateral treaties deposited at the UN
generally open their membership to all countries. This openness may result in a diverse set of
countries joining, in which case membership is unlikely to be associated with any particular
state characteristics. In addition, multilateral treaties are vulnerable to free-riding, so they
may not be as effective as bilateral treaties at generating cooperative surpluses; however, they
might solve coordination problems. The evidence for compliance with one type of
multilateral treaty—the human rights treaty—is mixed (compare Hathaway 2002, Neumayer
2007, Simmons 2006), but then the question arises why states would enter multilateral
treaties if they expected each other to free ride. If multilateral treaties are less important, or
mainly symbolic, they are not likely to be correlated with country characteristics.
Results from an examination of the fraction of multilateral treaties that are closed
confirm these patterns. Column (3) shows estimates from a regression on this variable.
Larger states, older states, and states with less corrupt governments have a higher share of
their multilateral treaties in closed form. The number of contiguous states correlates with a
lower incidence of non-UN multilateral treaty-making. Per-capita income does not correlate
with a higher share of non-UN multilateral treaties. A state’s participation in both UN and
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non-UN multilateral treaties rises with its income level, and the rise appears proportional
across the two forms of multilateral treaties.
Again, the United States’ treaty-making is atypical along these dimensions. The
average state makes 65% of its multilateral treaties outside of the UN or in closed form,
while for the United States, this figure is 91%. But the estimates from the remaining columns
of Panel B confirm that these patterns are not driven by the United States’ unusual treatymaking practices.
Reservations to UN Multilateral Treaties. Panel C of Table 2 reports regressions in which
the number of reservations advanced in UN multilateral treaties and the fraction of such
treaties joined with reservations are the dependent variables. When a state joins a multilateral
treaty subject to a reservation, it limits its obligations under the treaty. The perspective
developed here suggests that larger states might have more reservations than smaller states
because larger states gain less from multilateral treaties than smaller states do, given that
larger states are in a better position to produce public goods internally. Large states might
enter into more multilateral treaties because they have more treaty-making capacity, and the
additional reservations might reflect the fact that they are outvoted by more numerous small
countries on particular treaty issues during treaty negotiations.
The estimates in Panel C fail to support these hypotheses. The size of a state’s
population does not correlate with the number of reservations or the incidence of
reservations among the UN treaties joined. With the possible exception of a state’s income
level, which correlates weakly with the number of reservations, none of the observed state
characteristics exhibits a close relationship with reservations.
In the only statistical study of reservations—a study limited to the six major human
rights treaties—Neumayer (2007) finds that liberal democracies that join human rights
treaties issue reservations more frequently than nondemocracies do. Together with evidence
that liberal democracies have better human rights records, Neumayer’s results suggest that
liberal democracies issue reservations because they take their treaty obligations more
seriously than nondemocracies do (see Goldsmith and Posner 2005). In results not reported
here in order to conserve space, we tested this hypothesis using our data set and adding the
Polity IV variable for liberal rights. We found, consistent with Neumayer’s results, that more
liberal states were more likely to issue at least one reservation conditional on entering a
multilateral treaty (at the 10% level); however, liberal states were no less likely to enter
multilateral treaties. These results suggest either that treaties are more likely to reflect the
interests of authoritarian states than those of liberal states, so that liberal states need to use
reservations to adjust their obligations; or that treaties are taken more seriously by liberal
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states, and they enter reservations because otherwise governments cannot simply order
courts to ignore treaty obligations.
Columns (3) and (4) repeat the exercise excluding the United States, and the
estimates are almost unchanged. Moreover, with regard to reservations, the United States is
not an outlier. The average country lodges reservations in 24% of the UN treaties it joins,
and the United States does so in 21%.
Economic Treaties. Panel D provides an initial view of the variation in treaty-making
patterns by treaty subject matter. It presents estimates from regressions in which the
dependent variables are the percentage of treaties that pertain to economic subjects. Column
(1) presents estimates for the share of all treaties that pertain to economic topics, and the
remaining columns consider the incidence of this subject within each of the three major
treaty forms. The regression in column (1) shows that more populous, less corrupt, older,
and lower income countries have a higher fraction of their treaties relating to economic
issues.
The remaining columns show that population correlates with the frequency of
economic treaty-making irrespective of the form of the treaty. The share of bilateral and
non-UN multilateral treaties that address economic issues rises sharply with a state’s
population. While it is not statistically significant, the sign and magnitude of the point
estimate implies that this pattern persists in UN multilateral treaty-making as well.
The negative relationship between the share of economic treaty-making and a state’s
income level arises almost exclusively from bilateral treaties. This estimate is consistent with
the idea that wealthier countries may have less need to enter into economic bilateral treaties
because they have already achieved a high degree of economic success and thus focus their
bilateral treaty-making on other topics. As seen in previous tables, wealthier countries enter
into more treaties – of all types – than poorer countries. But the fraction of treaties that
pertain to non-economic subjects expands more rapidly as a state’s income rises. Thus, while
richer countries have more economic bilateral treaties, they account for a smaller share of
their bilateral treaty-making.
Another feature of economic treaty-making that appears due to almost entirely
economic treaty-making in the bilateral context is the correlation with corruption. More
honest governments have a high fraction of bilateral treaties pertaining to economic issues.

IV. Conclusion
17

The empirical regularities of treaty-making – such as which states enter into treaties
most often and which forms the treaties take – are poorly understood. This absence of
research on treaty-making is surprising given the central role of treaties in international
relations. This paper takes a first step at filling in this gap by generating a set of simple
predictions about treaty-making and testing those predictions against a data set of every
bilateral and multilateral treaty recorded since 1946. We find patterns of treaty-making
largely consistent with these predictions. Larger and wealthier states should benefit more
from cooperation, and should afford the costs of tailoring treaties to specific partners. These
states enter into more treaties and enter into more bilateral and closed multilateral treaties,
and in particular, larger states are more likely to enter bilateral and closed multilateral treaties
that pertain to economic matters. Older and less corrupt states should be more reliable treaty
partners, and they enter into more bilateral treaties and “closed” multilateral treaties.
Membership in treaties sponsored by the United Nations does not correlate with country
size, which is consistent with the U.N.’s goal of widespread participation, and low percountry transaction costs in negotiating these treaties.
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Appendix: Variable Definitions and Sources
All treaties. Sum of the number of bilateral and multilateral treaties a country has joined since 1946. Authors’
calculation from the number of bilateral and multilateral treaties.
Bilateral treaties. Tallies of the number of bilateral treaties ratified by each state since 1946. Authors’
tabulations from the Washington Treaty Index, http://db.lib.washington.edu/wti/wtbd.htm. See Section II for
a complete description of how these tabulations were made.
Multilateral treaties. Tallies of countries’ ratification of each multilateral treaties on deposit with the United
Nations since 1946. Authors’ tabulations from the United Nations Treaty Collection, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/English/treaty.asp. See Section II for a complete description of how these tabulations
were made.
Non-UN multilateral treaties. Tallies of the number of bilateral treaties ratified by each state since 1946.
Authors’ tabulations from the Washington Treaty Index, http://db.lib.washington.edu/wti/wtbd.htm. See
Section II for a complete description of how these tabulations were made.
Economic and non-economic treaties. The authors coded both bilateral and multilateral treaties according
to the 35 United Nations treaty subject categories on the basis of each treaty’s title. Treaties pertaining to (1)
trade and development; (2) transportation and communication; and (3) fiscal matters were grouped as
economic, and the remaining 32 categories were grouped as noneconomic.
Population. Natural logarithm of the country’s average population between 1980 and 2000. Authors’
calculations of data from Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2,
Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income, and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania,
September 2006, available at http:pwt.econ.upenn.edu/.
Real GDP per capita. Natural logarithm of the country’s average real gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita between 1980 and 2000. The data are deflated to a base year of 1996 using a Laspeyres index. Authors’
calculations of data from Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2,
Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income, and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania,
September 2006, available at http:pwt.econ.upenn.edu/.
Growth rate of real GDP per capita. Change in natural logarithm of a country’s average real GDP per capita
from 1980 to 2000. Authors’ calculations of data from Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, Penn
World Table Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income, and Prices at the
University of Pennsylvania, September 2006, available at http:pwt.econ.upenn.edu/.
Government Inefficiency. Average ratio of government expenditures to gross domestic product between
1980 and 2000. Authors’ calculations of data from Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, Penn
World Table Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income, and Prices at the
University of Pennsylvania, September 2006, available at http:pwt.econ.upenn.edu/.
Ethnolinguistic diversity. An index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization with values between 0 and 1. Higher
values indicate a higher degree of fractionalization. The data source is Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeshauwer,
William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg, 2003, “Fractionalization,” Journal of Economic Growth
8(2): 155-94 (June); available at http://www.stanford.edu/~wacziarg/downloads/fractionalization.xls.

22

Corruption perception index. A composite index measuring the degree of perceived corruption in a country.
It takes values between 1 and 7, with higher values indicating a more transparency and less corruption. The
values for 2006 are used. The data source is Internet Center for Corruption Research. The data are available at
http://www.iccg.org/downloads/CPI_2006.xls.
Number of contiguous states The sum of the number of states with contiguous borders. Data source:
Central Intelligence Agency, 2006, CIA World Factbook Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
Available at https://www.cia.gov/cia/download.htm.
Age of the country The number of years since a country’s independence. This figure is capped at 350 years.
Authors’ calculations from Central Intelligence Agency, 2006, CIA World Factbook Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office. Available at https://www.cia.gov/cia/download.htm.
Degree of political rights. These data are taken from Center for International Development and Conflict
Management, Polity IV Project, available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/data/.
Common or religious law country. These classifications are taken from the classification of the Faculty of
Law, Civil Law Section, University of Ottawa, available at http://www.droitcivil.uottawa.ca/world-legalsystems/eng-monde.php.
Degree of political globalization. This measure is the KOF Index of Political Globalization. The source is
Dreher (2006), available at http://www.kof.ch/globalization/.
Democracy. From Polity IV.
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A.

Table 1. Summary Statistics on Treaties (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
By Continent
Average Number of
State
Partners
in
Bilateral Treaties per
State
(1)

Average Number of
Non-State Partners in
Bilateral Treaties per
State
(2)

Average Number of
non-UN Multilateral
Treaties Joined per
State
(3)

Average Number of
Members per non-UN
Multilateral Treaty
(4)

Africa

211.54
(22.39)

100.00
(11.06)

171.74
(16.77)

49.71
(1.62)

Asia
(excluding
Southeast Asia)

586.78
(312.43)

109.56
(58.63)

174.67
(71.58)

25.90
(3.15)

Southeast Asia

693.42
(138.92)

218.25
(49.01)

290.80
(32.40)

41.65
(1.11)

Latin America

368.17
(78.26)

93.83
(16.55)

236.12
(23.80)

43.32
(1.83)

North America

3,210.33
(1,985.90)

354.00
(119.54)

672.33
(159.90)

30.15
(4.98)

Europe

770.94
(147.62)

86.68
(16.22)

568.55
(83.18)

30.01
(1.46)

Mideast

592.43
(79.16)

137.14
(21.95)

256.13
(49.79)

38.72
(2.88)

World

462.96
(72.55)

116.30
(10.66)

326.59
(28.34)

39.30
(1.08)

Continent
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A.

Table 1. Summary Statistics on Treaties (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
By Continent (cont.)
Average Number of
UN Treaties Joined
with Reservations per
State

Average Number of
Treaty Partners per
UN Treaty Joined with
Reservations

(7)

(8)

112.22
(3.65)

20.43
(1.63)

128.70
(3.96)

84.67
(7.98)

108.40
(3.85)

21.67
(1.5)

118.63
(4.37)

Southeast Asia

110.92
(9.07)

101.67
(4.25)

22.92
(1.42)

117.55
(4.16)

Latin America

83.92
(3.96)

114.46
(1.96)

19.42
(.76)

132.39
(2.38)

North America

113.00
(8.96)

98.81
(2.99)

26.33
(3.18)

110.84
(4.63)

Europe

172.90
(11.43)

82.45
(3.30)

36.45
(2.23)

95.54
(4.16)

Mideast

104.43
(13.18)

102.83
(6.19)

23.43
(1.91)

116.22
(3.93)

World

113.76
(5.26)

102.58
(1.89)

25.12
(1.00)

117.64
(2.14)

Average Number of
UN Treaties Joined per
State

Average Number of
Treaty Partners per
UN Treaty Joined

Continent

(5)

(6)

Africa

90.36
(8.64)

Asia
(excluding
Southeast Asia)
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Table 1. Summary Statistics on Treaties
B. By Subject Matter of Treaty (Means and in Parentheses Standard Errors, unless otherwise specified)

Bilateral Treaties
between
States:
Number
and
Percentage
of
Total

Bilateral Treaties
between State and
Non-State Entity:
Number
and
Percentage
of
Total

Number of nonUN
Multilateral
Treaties: Number
and Percentage of
Total

Average Number
of Members per
non-UN
Multilateral Treaty

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Diplomatic & Consular
Relations

2,480 (6.8%)

449 (5.3%)

266 (4.25%)

3.6 (0.4)

Human Rights

7 (0.0%)

23 (0.3%)

107 (1.71%)

9.5 (1.8)

Refugees

19 (0.0%)

8 (0.1%)

72 (1.15%)

4.3 (0.8)

Education & Culture

3,259 (8.5%)

336 (3.9%)

229 ( 3.66%)

2.6 (0.3)

Civil
&
Litigation

848 (2.2%)

96 (1.1%)

167 (2.67%)

2.1 (0.3)

Economic:

21,935 (57.4%)

6,198 (72.8%)

3,156 (50.4%)

4.2 (0.2)

(1) International Trade &
Development

12,946 (33.9%)

5,373 (63.1%)

2,189 (34.98%)

3.7 (0.2)

(2) Transportation
Communication

4,022 (10.5%)

303 (3.6%)

597 (9.54%)

6.0 (0.5)

(3) Fiscal Matters

4,967 (13.0%)

522 (6.1%)

370 (5.91%)

3.8 (0.5)

All Other Categories

9,640 (25.0%)

1,405 (16.5%)

2,261 (36.13%)

4.4 (0.3)

Total

38,186 (100.0%)

8,513 (100.0%)

6,258 (100%)

4.2 (.03)

Selected Treaty Subject
Matters

Criminal

&
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Table 1. Summary Statistics on Treaties (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
B.

By Subject Matter of Treaty (Means and in Parentheses Standard Errors, unless otherwise specified) (cont.)

Number of UN
Multilateral
Treaties: Number
and Percentage of
Total

Average Number
of Members per
UN
Multilateral
Treaty

Fraction of UN
Multilateral
Treaties Where a
State Joined with
Reservations

Average Number
of Members per
UN
Multilateral
Treaty
Having
Reservations

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Diplomatic & Consular
Relations

31 (4.6%)

43.9
(10.7)

.129
(.061)

91.5
(41.9)

Human Rights

19 (2.8%)

28.7
(12.0)

.368
(.114)

74.1
(25.2)

Refugees

5 (2.8%)

62.2
(30.3)

.400
(.245)

123.0
(42.0)

Education & Culture

9 (0.7%)

34.9
(18.7)

.444
(.176)

70.0
(36.0)

Civil
&
Litigation

16 (2.4%)

44.4
(16.8)

.563
(.128)

60.4
(23.7)

Economic:

212 (31.8%)

30.0
(3.0)

.127
(.023)

49.9
(10.3)

(1) International Trade &
Development

20 (3.0%)

22.9
(9.0)

.200
(.092)

68.3
(35.6)

(2) Transportation
Communication

190 (28.5%)

31.0
(3.2)

.121
(.024)

46.3
(10.7)

--

--

--

Selected Treaty Subject
Matters

Criminal

(3) Fiscal Matters

&

2 (0.3%)

All Other Categories

375 (56.2%)

31.5
(2.2)

.101
(.016)

37.1
(6.9)

Total

667 (100.0%)

32.1
(1.7)

.136
(.013)

51.7
(5.8)
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Table 2: Ordinary Least Squares Regressions: Treaties as a Function of Country Characteristics
A. Total Treaties and Bilateral Treaties
Log
Treaties

All Log Bilateral % of Treaties Log Bilateral Log Bilateral % of Treaties
are Bilateral
Treaties
Treaties
are Bilateral
Treaties

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

.290***
(.044)

.436***
(.074)

5.273**
(1.340)

.282**
(.046)

.427**
(.074)

5.273**
(1.340)

per .175**
(.071)

.212*
(.115)

.578
(2.189)

.168**
(.071)

.205*
(.116)

.578
(2.189)

Ethnolinguistic diversity .108
(.198)

-.002
(.265)

-5.793
(5.507)

.110
(.197)

.001
(.265)

-5.793
(5.507)

Corruption
index

perception .097**
(.037)

.125**
(.058)

.323
(1.022)

.098**
(.037)

.127**
(.058)

.323
(1.022)

Number of contiguous -.012
countries
(.023)

-.007
(.034)

.440
(.644)

-.009
(.023)

-.004
(.034)

.440
(.644)

Log age of the country

.379**
(.098)

.548**
(.160)

6.283**
(2.525)

.384**
(.100)

.127**
(.058)

6.283**
(2.525)

Common Law Country

.168*
(.095)

.041
(.151)

-1.548
(3.000)

-.153*
(.095)

-.004
(.034)

-1.548
(3.000)

Religious Law Country

.108
(.139)

.121
(.197)

2.201
(3.556)

.111
(.141)

.124
(.199)

2.201
(3.556)

Including U.S.?

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

R-square

.8143

.8002

.6743

.8045

.7911

.6743

N

114

114

114

113

113

113

Log Population

Log Real
capita

GDP

Note: Each regression also includes a constant and fixed effects for continents whose coefficients are not reported to conserve
space. ** denotes coefficients significant at the 5% level, and * denotes coefficients significant at the 10% level. Coefficients and
in parentheses standard errors.
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Table 2 (cont.): Ordinary Least Squares Regressions: Treaties as a Function of Country Characteristics
B. Multilateral Treaties
Log
UN
Multilateral
Treaties

Log
Non-UN
Multilateral
Treaties

% of Multilateral
Treaties are nonUN

Log
UN
Multilateral
Treaties

Log
Non-UN
Multilateral
Treaties

% of Multilateral
Treaties are nonUN

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Log Population

.012
(.073)

.245**
(.053)

4.049**
(1.233)

.018
(.075)

.252**
(.054)

4.113**
(1.267)

Log Real GDP per
capita

.141**
(.072)

.177**
(.087)

.873
(1.971)

.146**
(.072)

.183**
(.087)

.928
(1.940)

Ethnolinguistic
diversity

.050
(.212)

.290
(.271)

4.647
(6.183)

.048
(.210)

.289
(.272)

4.631
(6.209)

Corruption
perception index

.027
(.038)

.123**
(.051)

1.922*
(1.157)

.027
(.038)

.122**
(.051)

1.912*
(1.160)

.017
(.019)

-.050*
(.030)

-1.352**
(.688)

.015
(.019)

-.052
(.030)

1.370**
(.685)

Log age of the
country

.175
(.142)

.378**
(.098)

5.856**
(2.352)

.172
(.143)

.375**
(.098)

5.825**
(2.359)

Common
Country

Law

.134
(.122)

.081
(.116)

-2.071
(2.755)

.144
(.123)

.093
(.116)

-1.1953
(2.774)

Religious
Country

Law

.070
(.210)

.026
(.164)

.195
(3.755)

.068
(.209)

.024
(.163)

.171
(3.755)

Including U.S.?

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

R-square

.2488

.7115

.5073

.2506

.7069

.4994

N

114

114

114

113

113

113

Number
contiguous
countries

of

Note: Each regression also includes a constant and fixed effects for continents whose coefficients are not reported to conserve
space. ** denotes coefficients significant at the 5% level, and * denotes coefficients significant at the 10% level. Coefficients and
in parentheses standard errors.
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Table 2 (cont.): Ordinary Least Squares Regressions: Treaties as a Function of Country Characteristics
C. Reservations on UN Multilateral Treaties

Log Reservations

%
of
UN
Multilateral
Treaties Having
Reservations

Log Reservations

%
of
UN
Multilateral
Treaties Having
Reservations

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Log Population

.018
(.054)

.652
(1.092)

.026
(.056)

.720
(1.128)

Log Real GDP per capita

.103*
(.068)

-.765
(.935)

.110*
(.067)

-.707
(.936)

Ethnolinguistic diversity

-.023
(.177)

-1.689
(2.354)

-.025
(.174)

-1.705
(2.372)

Corruption perception index

.016
(.032)

-.396
(.416)

.015
(.032)

-.407
(.422)

Number of contiguous countries

.014
(.014)

-.114
(.270)

.012
(.015)

-1.340
(.273)

Log age of the country

.139
(.100)

-2.044
(2.131)

.135
(.101)

-2.079
(2.149)

Common Law Country

.112
(.105)

-.732
(1.164)

.127
(.106)

-.607
(1.163)

Religious Law Country

.003
(.152)

2.813
(3.008)

.000
(.152)

-2.839
(3.032)

Including U.S.?

Yes

Yes

No

No

R-square

.2931

.0923

.3007

.0971

N

114

114

113

113

Note: Each regression also includes a constant and fixed effects for continents whose coefficients are not reported to conserve
space. ** denotes coefficients significant at the 5% level, and * denotes coefficients significant at the 10% level. Coefficients and
in parentheses standard errors.
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Table 2 (cont.) Ordinary Least Squares Regressions: Treaties as a Function of Country Characteristics
D. Economic Treaties

% of Treaties Economic

% of Treaties
Multilateral
Economic

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Log Population

2.187**
(.572)

.957*
(.740)

.794
(.654)

1.519**
(.734)

Log Real GDP per capita

-3.710**
(1.140)

-6.566**
(1.449)

-.555
(1.148)

.175
(1.557)

Ethnolinguistic diversity

1.603
(3.281)

4.179
(3.057)

1.554
(3.230)

3.286
(5.112)

Corruption
index

1.449**
(.518)

1.141**
(.563)

.670
(.463)

.861
(.546)

Number of contiguous
countries

-.447
(.292)

-.921**
(.361)

-.509*
(.263)

-.281
(.388)

Log age of the country

2.673**
(1.075)

1.215
(1.161)

.611
(1.189)

2.829**
(1.314)

Common Law Country

.860
(1.583)

1.159
(1.709)

.223
(1.926)

3.100
(2.417)

Religious Law Country

2.618
(3.470)

2.796
(2.921)

5.098*
(2.743)

-.326
(5.834)

R-square

.6379

.5684

.3160

.3608

N

114

114

114

114

perception

UN
and

% of Treaties Non-UN
Multilateral
and
Economic

% of Treaties Bilateral
and Economic

Note: Each regression also includes a constant and fixed effects for continents whose coefficients are not reported to conserve
space. ** denotes coefficients significant at the 5% level, and * denotes coefficients significant at the 10% level.

31

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Eric A. Posner
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
eposner@uchicago.edu

Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics
(Second Series)
For a listing of papers 1–299 please go to Working Papers at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Adam B. Cox, The Temporal Dimension of Voting Rights (July 2006)
Adam B. Cox, Designing Redistricting Institutions (July 2006)
Cass R. Sunstein, Montreal vs. Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols (August 2006)
Kenneth W. Dam, Legal Institutions, Legal Origins, and Governance (August 2006)
Anup Malani and Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities (September 2006)
Douglas Lichtman, Irreparable Benefits (September 2006)
M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation when Agency Costs
Are Low (September 2006)
Michael Abramowicz and M. Todd Henderson, Prediction Markets for Corporate Governance
(September 2006)
Randal C. Picker, Who Should Regulate Entry into IPTV and Municipal Wireless? (September
2006)
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive (September 2006)
David Gilo and Ariel Porat, The Unconventional Uses of Transaction Costs (October 2006)
Randal C. Picker, Review of Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution
(October 2006)
Dennis W. Carlton and Randal C. Picker, Antitrust and Regulation (October 2006)
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Liability Externalities and Mandatory Choices: Should Doctors
Pay Less? (November 2006)
Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law (November
2006)
Lior J. Strahilevitz, Wealth without Markets? (November 2006)
Ariel Porat, Offsetting Risks (November 2006)
Bernard E. Harcourt and Jens Ludwig, Reefer Madness: Broken Windows Policing and
Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 1989–2000 (December 2006)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Embracing Chance: Post-Modern Meditations on Punishment (December
2006)
Cass R. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism (December 2006)
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Presidential Pardons and
Commutations (January 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberating Groups versus Prediction Markets (or Hayek’s Challenge to
Habermas) (January 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, Completely Theorized Agreements in Constitutional Law (January 2007)
Albert H. Choi and Eric A. Posner, A Critique of the Odious Debt Doctrine (January 2007)
Wayne Hsiung and Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Animals (January 2007)
Cass. R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis without Analyzing Costs or Benefits: Reasonable
Accommodation, Balancing and Stigmatic Harms (January 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, Willingness to Pay versus Welfare (January 2007)
David A. Weisbach, The Irreducible Complexity of Firm-Level Income Taxes: Theory and
Doctrine in the Corporate Tax (January 2007)
Randal C. Picker, Of Pirates and Puffy Shirts: A Comments on “The Piracy Paradox: Innovation
and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design” (January 2007)
Eric A. Posner, Climate Change and International Human Rights Litigation: A Critical Appraisal
(January 2007)
Randal C. Picker, Pulling a Rabbi Out of His Hat: The Bankruptcy Magic of Dick Posner
(February 2007)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Judge Richard Posner on Civil Liberties: Pragmatic (Libertarian)
Authoritarian (February 2007)

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.

Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care? (February
2007)
Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For (March 2007)
Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in International Law (March 2007)
Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Asylum to the Prison: Rethinking the Incarceration Revolution.
Part II: State Level Analysis (March 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process Traditionalism (March 2007)
Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act (March 2007)
M. Todd Henderson, Deconstructing Duff & Phelps (March 2007)
Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, The Prime Directive (April 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, Illusory Losses (May 2007)
Anup Malani, Valuing Laws as Local Amenities (June 2007)
David A. Weisbach, What Does Happiness Research Tell Us about Taxation? (June 2007)
David S. Abrams and Chris Rohlfs, Optimal Bail and the Value of Freedom: Evidence from the
Philadelphia Bail Experiment (June 2007)
Christopher R. Berry and Jacob E. Gersen, The Fiscal Consequences of Electoral Institutions
(June 2007)
Matthew Adler and Eric A. Posner, Happiness Research and Cost-Benefit Analysis (July 2007)
Daniel Kahneman and Cass R. Sunstein, Indignation: Psychology, Politics, Law (July 2007)
Jacob E. Gersen and Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions (July 2007)
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns (July 2007)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy versus Antidiscrimination (July 2007)
Bernard E. Harcourt, A Reader’s Companion to Against Prediction: A Reply to Ariela Gross,
Yoram Margalioth, and Yoav Sapir on Economic Modeling, Selective Incapacitation,
Governmentality, and Race (July 2007)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “Don’t Try This at Home”: Posner as Political Economist (July 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, The Complex Climate Change Incentives of China and the United States
(August 2007)
David S. Abrams and Marianne Bertrand, Do Judges Vary in Their Treatment of Race? (August
2007)
Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice (August 2007)
David A. Weisbach, A Welfarist Approach to Disabilities (August 2007)
David S. Abrams, More Time, Less Crime? Estimating the Deterrent Effect of Incarceration using
Sentencing Enhancements (August 2007)
Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati and Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain
Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary (August 2007)
Joseph Bankman and David A. Weisbach, Consumption Taxation Is Still Superior to Income
Taxation (September 2007)
Douglas G. Baird and M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money (September 2007)
William Meadow and Cass R. Sunstein, Causation in Tort: General Populations vs. Individual
Cases (September 2007)
removed by author
Richard McAdams, Reforming Entrapment Doctrine in United States v. Hollingsworth (September
2007)
M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent (October
2007)
Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation (October 2007)
David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity (October 2007)
Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0 (October 2007)
Jonathan R. Nash and Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Investigation into Appellate Structure and the
Perceived Quality of Appellate Review (October 2007)
Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review (November 2007)
Anup Malani, Maciej F. Boni, Abraham Wickelgren, and Ramanan Laxminarayan, Controlling
Avian Influenza in Chickens (November 2007)
Richard H. McAdams, The Economic Costs of Inequality (November 2007)

371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.

Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information
(November 2007)
Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism (December 2007)
M. Todd Henderson, Everything Old Is New Again: Lessons from Dodge V. Ford Motor
Company (December 2007)
Jonathan Remy Nash, Economic Efficiency versus Public Choice: The Case of Property Rights in
Road Traffic (December 2007)
Edward L. Glaeser and Cass R. Sunstein, Extremism and Social Learning (December 2007)
Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Are Judges Overpaid?: A Skeptical Response
to the Judicial Salary Debate (December 2007)
Eric A. Posner, Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications of Judicial Bias Studies
for Legal and Constitutional Reform (January 2008)
Susan Bandes, The Heart Has Its Reasons: Examining the Strange Persistence of the American
Death Penalty (January 2008)
Susan Bandes, After Innocence: Framing Wrongful Convictions (January 2008)
Jacob E. Gersen and Ann Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law (January 2008)
Richard A. Epstein, The Property Rights Movement and Intellectual Property (January 2008)
Richard A. Epstein, Some Reflections on Custom in the IP Universe (January 2008)
Richard A. Epstein, Decentralized Responses to Good Fortune and Bad Luck (January 2008)
Richard A. Epstein, How to Create—or Destroy—Wealth in Real Property (January 2008)
Richard A. Epstein, The Human and Economic Dimensions of Altruism: The Case of Organ
Transplantation (January 2008)
Cass R. Sunstein, Adolescent Risk-Taking and Social Meaning: A Commentary (January 2008)
Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Conspiracy Theories (January 2008)
Ariel Porat, Expanding Restitution: Liability for Unrequested Benefits (January 2008)
Randal C. Picker, Twombly, Leegin and the Reshaping of Antitrust (February 2008)
Alon Harrel and Ariel Porat, Aggregating Probabilities across Offences in Criminal Law (March
2008)
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur, Hedonic Adaptation and the
Settlement of Civil Lawsuits (March 2008)
Randal C. Picker, Fair Use v. Fair Access (March 2008)
Jonathan S. Masur, Process as Purpose: Administrative Procedures, Costly Screens, and
Examination at the Patent Office (March 2008, revised July 2008)
Eric A. Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights (March 2008)
Lee Anne Fennell, Slices and Lumps, 2008 Coase Lecture (March 2008)
Eric A. Posner, Fault in Contract Law (March 2008)
Cass R. Sunstein, Is OSHA Unconstitutional? (March 2008)
Randal C. Picker, Take Two: Stare Decisis in Antitrust/The Per Se Rule against Horizontal PriceFixing (March 2008)
M. Todd Henderson and Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for Altruism (April
2008)
Shyam Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives (April 2008)
Cass R. Sunstein and Reid Hastie, Four Failures of Deliberating Groups (April 2008)
M. Todd Henderson, Justin Wolfers and Eric Zitzewitz, Predicting Crime (April 2008)
Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised)
Summary Judgments (April 2008)
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study (April
2008)
Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Which States Have the Best (and Worst) High
Courts? (May 2008)
Richard H. McAdams and Janice Nadler, Coordinating in the Shadow of the Law: Two
Contextualized Tests of the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance (May 2008)
Cass R. Sunstein, Two Conceptions of Irreversible Environmental Harm (Mary 2008)
Richard A. Epstein, Public Use in a Post-Kelo World (June 2008)
Jonathan R. Nash, The Uneasy Case for Transjurisdictional Adjudication (June 2008)
Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Documenting Discrimination? (June 2008)

411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.

M. Todd Henderson, Alan D. Jagolinzer, and Karl A. Muller, III, Scienter Disclosure (June 2008)
Jonathan R. Nash, Taxes and the Success of Non-Tax Market-Based Environmental Regulatory
Regimes (July 2008)
Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, Depoliticizing Administrative Law (June 2008)
Randal C. Picker, Competition and Privacy in Web 2.0 and the Cloud (June 2008)
Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the “Opportunity to Read” in Contract Law (July 2008)
Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Gap-Filling (July 2008)
Omri Ben-Shahar, How to Repair Unconscionable Contracts (July 2008)
Richard A. Epstein and David A. Hyman, Controlling the Costs of Medical Care: A Dose of
Deregulation (July 2008)
Eric A. Posner, Erga Omnes Norms, Institutionalization, and Constitutionalism in International
Law (August 2008)
Thomas J. Miles and Eric A. Posner, Which States Enter into Treaties, and Why? (August 2008)

